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Introduction  
 
µ$OOJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQVDUHLQWHUHVWLQJVRPHDUHVXUSULVLQJRQO\DIHZFDQEHGHVFULEHG
DV DVWRQLVKLQJ¶ 'DYLG 'HQYHU QRWHV LQ KLV FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKLV YROXPH µ7KH ODWWHU
FHUWDLQO\ DSSOLHV WR ¶ This is certainly true but what made the election truly 
astonishing was the emergence of anti-political sentiment as a key resource for a 
mainstream party channelled through a particular blend of hybrid populism. In order to 
develop this argument and dissect what might be termed the (anti-)politics of #GE2017 
this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section seeks to place #GE2017 
within its broader historical and comparative context and places particular emphasis on 
the post-Brexit collapse of UKIP and how this changed the political landscape in ways 
that Labour would later exploit. The second section develops this argument by arguing 
WKDW µWKH&RUE\QHIIHFW¶ZDVHVVHQWLDOO\V\QRQ\PRXVZLWKWKHDGRSWLRQRID populist 
strategy that sought to re-frame the Labour Party as a fresh, new, anti-political, anti-
HVWDEOLVKPHQWµRXWVLGHU¶SDUW\7KLVUH-positioning of the Labour Party under Jeremy 
&RUE\Q UHSUHVHQWV DUJXDEO\ WKH PRVW µDVWRQLVKLQJ¶ HOHPHQW RI WKH  *HQHUDO
Election and helps explain how the party exceeded expectations to secure µa glorious 
GHIHDW¶7KHILQDOVHFWLRQVWHSVEDFNWRreflect on the long-terms risks of this strategy in 
terms of the perils of playing with populism. 
 
 
1.  The Anti-Political Context of #GE2017  
 
The aim of this section is to provide the historical foundations and social context that 
framed the (anti-)politics of #GE2017, in general, and the strategic positioning of the 
Labour Party, in particular. It therefore begins from a fairly broad focus on anti-politics 
and narrows down to a focus on British politics in the run up to #GE2017. The core 
argument is that the political opportunity structure within the British party system 
altered significantly in the wake of Brexit and that this allowed the Labour Party to 
adopt an explicitly anti-SROLWLFDO µRXWVLGHU¶ VWDWXs under the leadership of Jeremy 
Corbyn. It was the replacement of one anti-political lightning rod (i.e. UKIP) with 
DQRWKHU LH µ1HZ Old¶ /DERXU %XW LQ WHUPV RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKLV transition it is 
necessary to take five steps. The first step simply acknowledges the existence of a 
burgeoning and international seam of scholarship on democratic decline and political 
GLVDIIHFWLRQZLWKLQZKLFKWKHZRUGVµGHDWK¶µHQG¶µVXLFLGH¶µFULVLV¶DQGµKDWUHG¶ORRP
large (see, for example, Tormey, 2015; Roberts, 2017). This literature reveals not only 
the rise of anti-political sentiment in advanced liberal democracies but also the rise of 
SRSXOLVW SROLWLFLDQV DQG µLQVXUJHQW SDUWLHV¶ LQ OLJKW RI WKH ZLGHVSUHDG SHUFHSWLRQ
amongst large sections of the public that democratic politics is somehow failing. The 
existence of anti-political sentiment in the UK is therefore by no means exceptional but 
what might be more unique from a comparative perspective is the manner in which 
#GE2017 involved a mainstream party stepping into the anti-political space created by 
the implosion of an insurgent party.  
 
Our second step is therefore concerned with understanding the social and economic 
drivers of anti-political sentiment and how they might relate to the British context. Two 
drivers or explanations deserve brief comment. The first is the economic inequality 
perspective that highlights µoverwhelming evidence of powerful trends toward greater 
income and wealth inequality in the West, based on the rise of the knowledge economy, 
technological automation, and the collapse of manufacturing industry, global flows of 
labor, goods, peoples, and capital (especially the inflow of migrants and refugees), the 
erosion of organized labor, shrinking welfare safety-nets, and neo-liberal austerity 
policies¶ ,QJOHKDUW DQG 1RUULV  It is not just that economic inequality is 
increasing but also that levels of economic insecurity DUHLQFUHDVLQJ7KHµJLJHFRQRP\¶
demands workers that are highly educated, hyper-mobile and exist in a precarious 
economic position where security and social protections are scarce commodities. In a 
manner that offers the first hint of a new axis or bifurcation within British politics 
(discussed below), the critical element of the economic inequality perspective is that 
the nature of work and employment is changing rapidly. If you are older, less educated 
or live beyond thriving cities then securing well-paid or long-term employment is 
increasingly difficult. However, even if you are young, educated and live in the sunlit 
cosmopolitan uplands of Cambridge, Oxford, Bristol or Exeter then work is still likely 
to be a fairly precarious endeavour.  
 
This argument flows into a focus on the second and related explanation for increasing 
µDQWL-SROLWLFV¶ WKH cultural backlash theory. Democratic disaffection from this 
perspective is not a purely economic phenomenon but is in large part a reaction against 
progressive cultural change. Public support for progressive values such as 
cosmopolitanism, feminism, environmentalism, etc., were to some extent based on the 
security delivered through post-war economic growth. In a period of global economic 
DXVWHULW\ WKH µFXOWXUDO HVFDODWRU¶ appears to have stopped or even to have gone into 
reverse in some countries as public commitment to progressive values has waned. µ7KH
VLOHQWUHYROXWLRQRIWKHV¶Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris conclude µDSSHDUVWR
have spawned an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today (2016, 
p.5).¶ 
 
The third step involves a shift from these broad international explanations of social and 
political change to a consideration of their relevance in the British context. In this 
regard the rise and role of UKIP is critical. Put very simply, as the work of Goodwin 
and Milazzo (2015) illustrates, UKIP rose to become the most significant new 
independent party in post-war British politics by recognising and to some extent 
cultivating anti-political sentiment as a political resource (i.e. as a commodity to be 
tapped into and exploited). Under Nigel Farage, UKIP presented a populist and simple 
critique of mainstream politics¶ µHVWDEOLVKPHQWHOLWHV¶that focused on their perceived 
failure to control immigration. The party therefore cultivated a reputation as an 
µRXWVLGHU¶RUµLQVXUJHQW¶SDUW\WKDWZDVZLOOLQJWRFKDOOHQJHthe mainstream on behalf 
RI µWKH FRPPRQ SHRSOH¶ RU µJUHDW %ULWLVK SXEOLF¶ ,Q GRLQJ VR WKH\ HPSKDVLVHG WKH
growth of economic inequality and insecurity while highlighting perceived threats to 
British culture and tradition. 0RUHRYHU WKH 8.,3 µRIIHU¶ WUDQVFHQGHG WUDGLWLRQDO
partisan and class divides in the sense that it appealed to those on the right who were 
concerned about traditional British values and European encroachment, and those on 
the left who felt the Labour Party now looked down upon traditional working class 
sentiments and values, such as patriotism and flying the flag of St George. Carried on 
a wave of anti-political sentiment, UKIP enjoyed a number of successes in 2014 and 
2015 that included winning 163 seats (+128) in the 2014 local elections, securing the 
greatest number of votes (27.5%) of any British party in the 2014 European Parliament 
elections (producing 24 MEPs), winning two by-elections in late 2014 and then 
securing over 3.8 million votes (12.6%) at the 2015 General Election. UKIP had 
fractured the traditional party system and exerted a strong blackmail effect on the 
mainstream parties (see, for example, Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Heath, 
2016a; Goodwin and Heath, 2016b). 
 
To some extent the influence of UKIP had already been evident in the form of David 
&DPHURQ¶V%ORRPEHUJVSHHFKin January 2013 that contained a commitment to hold a 
UHIHUHQGXPRQWKH8.¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(8VKRXOGWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHs win the 2015 
General Election - a commitment intended to allow Conservative MPs to fight off the 
UKIP threat in many constituencies. It was, in fact, the disproportionality embedded 
within the simple-plurality electoral system that prevented the 2015 UKIP surge being 
translated into seats in Parliament but the result did reveal the manner in which anti-
political sentiment could be almost sown, cultivated and harvested as a political fuel or 
resource. The subsequent Brexit referendum demonstrated the existence of an 
LQFUHDVLQJO\ µGLYLGHG GHPRFUDF\¶ LQ ZKLFK DQWL-elite, anti-establishment, anti-
European, anti-mainstream variants of anti-political sentiment could coalesce around 
one issue: membership of the EU. With the benefit of hindsight what was particularly 
noteworthy about the µ/HDYH¶campaign was the manner in which relatively simplistic 
and emotionally charged statements could forge a powerful and ultimately successful 
connection with both longstanding British cultural idiosyncrasies vis-à-vis the EU and 
also more recent economic and cultural social anxieties, notably concerning 
immigration.  
 
The shared and arguably most critical, but under-acknowledged, element of the UKIP 
surge in 2015, the Brexit referendum in 2016 and the 2017 General Election was the 
role of emotional resonance (or lack of). As Alan Finlayson (2017) has noted, Brexit 
EHFDPHDFDPSDLJQRIµDQWi-political politics organised around resentment at past losses 
DQGVFHSWLFLVPDERXWSURPLVHG IXWXUHV¶7KHVHQVHRID ORVVRI WUDGLWLRQDP\WKLFDO
integrity, an eviscerated global status, a romanticised past plus a nativist and nationalist 
anxiety were all set against the perceived excesses of a distant European elite. The 
weakness in the response of the mainstream parties, politicians DQGµ5HPDLQHUV¶was 
arguably their failure to grasp why emotions matter. Against a backdrop of economic 
austerity and cultural anxiety the political appeal of the rhetorical emphasis placed by 
ERWK8.,3DQGWKHµ/HDYH¶FDPSDLJQRQµSXWWLQJ%ULWDLQILUVW¶µWDNLQJEDFNFRQWURO¶
µVWUHQJWKHQLQJERUGHUV¶DQGµVDYLQJPRQH\¶tapped into a powerful source of emotive 
desire. This dHVLUHPD\QRWKDYHEHHQµUDWLRQDO¶IURPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRIDVFLHQWLILF
evidence-based analysis EXWWKHHPHUJHQFHRIµH[SHUWUHMHFWLRQ¶XQGHUOLQHGWKHPDQQHU
in which emotions trump rationality. If you feel scared, threatened, alienated, 
pessimistic, trapped or unloved, then no matter how many times you are told such 
feelings are irrational the feelings remain true. As J. D. Taylor argues in his wonderful 
book, Island Story µ3ROLWLFVKDVQHYHU EHHQDPDWWHURIUHDVRQEXWRIIHHOLQJ¶
and in this regard it is possible to suggest that UKIP possessed a far more sensitive 
emotional antennae than the mainstream parties. This leads us to a fourth step that 
connects what might be termed this anti-political momentum with the shifting political 
terrain on which #GE2017 was fought: the emergence of a new bifurcation or axis 
within British, or more specifically English, politics (see Tables 1 and 2, below).  
 
Table 17KHµ2OG¶DQGµ1HZ¶%LIXUFDWLRQVRI%ULWLVK3ROLWLFV 
Traditional Post-War Bifurcation 
Tory Labour 
Urban and rural, educated middle and upper 
classes working largely within the private sector, 
or with family money. Plus some working class 
supporters. 
Traditional working class and public sector 
employees, largely in densely populated 
industrial areas.  
Post-Millennium Emergent Axis 
Tory Labour 
Backwater (but needing to expand their 
bandwidth into the cosmopolitan sphere). 
Cosmopolitan (with elements of the backwater 
constituencies). 
 
 
 
Table 2. The New Tribes  
 Cosmopolitan Backwater 
Exemplar Cambridge Clacton 
Outlook External/Global Internal/National 
View on European Union  Relatively Positive Generally Negative 
 View on Immigration Relatively Positive Generally Negative 
Ethnicity Diverse/Integrated Generally White/Polarised 
Dominant spatial features Integrated transport, bright, 
fast-paced, 24/7 
Limited public transport, dilapidated 
public infrastructure, etc. 
Urban Geography Apple stores, juice bars, out of 
town mega-malls, university 
buildings, etc.  
Pit villages without pits, fishing 
ports without fish, steel cities 
without steel, railway towns without 
railways, seaside piers without 
tourists.1 
Employment Sectors Knowledge economy, 
entertainment, financial 
services, service sector, etc. 
Food production, agriculture, call 
centres, etc. 
Employment status Precarious ± gig economy, 
IOXLGIOH[LEOHµSRUWIROLR
FDUHHUV¶ 
Precarious ± seasonal, minimum 
wage, zero hour contracts,  
Progressive Values Likely  Unlikely 
Orientation Future-focused Backward-looking 
Age/Education Young/Educated Older/Less Educated 
Anti-Political Yes Yes 
Psycho-geography Anywheres Somewheres 
Identity Profile Achieved identity (via success) Ascribed identity (via place or 
group) 
Epithet µ/RRNLQJ)RUZDUG¶ µ/HIW%HKLQG¶ 
Source: Created through synthesising the complementary social profiles offered by Jennings and Stoker 
(2016, 2017) and Goodhart (2017) 
 
Such simplistic binary models are clearly problematic in terms of providing a refined 
and sophisticated grasp on an increasingly complex social reality but the research on 
which they are based does point to the existence of what might be termed an increasing 
µVRFLDO VWUHWFK¶ZLWKLQ%ULWLVK VRFLHW\ DQG LQPDQ\RWKHU OLEHUDOGHPRFUDFLHV  What 
Table 1 and Table 2 succeeds in illustrating is evidence of a shift from a relatively 
simple and class-based divide between traditional Tory and Labour voters (i.e. the 
traditional post-war bifurcation) towards a more diagonal, fluid and opaque political 
axis in which traditional voting groups have been splintered (see Jennings and Stoker, 
2016). The aim of Table 1 and Table 2 is not to suggest that the traditioQDOµOHIW¶¶ULJKW¶
spectrum no longer matters but simply that socio-political linkages are becoming more 
complex. The traditional post-war bifurcation, with its layer-cake type qualities, is to 
some extent now overlaid with a more multifaceted post-millennium axis. At the heart 
of this new axis is a contrast between growing cosmopolitan (southern) cities and 
shrinking provincial settings RU µEDFNZDWHUV¶ 7KH ODWWHU are home to those who 
generally lose out from the forces of globalisation and are therefore loci of economic 
deprivation and significant cultural tensions. The Brexit surge was therefore largely 
focused within backwater coastal resorts of the East of England and large post-
industrial areas of Northern England. The emergence of this new axis matters because 
the political demands placed upon political parties by citizens in cosmopolitan as 
RSSRVHG WR EDFNZDWHU RU µQRQ-FRVPRSROLWDQ¶ DUHDV DUH OLNHO\ WR EH YHU\ GLIIHUHQW
almost to the extent of being diametrically opposed. The demand-side expectations 
placed upon democratic politics are therefore arguably increasing in terms of 
complexity. Subsequently political parties seeking to secure a governing majority will 
somehow have to EULGJH ERWK ZRUOGV ERWK µ(QJODQGV¶ WR SDUDSKUDVH -HQQLQJV DQG 
Stoker. The implication being that parties will have to offer a broad political 
µEDQGZLGWK¶LQRUGHUWRVWUDGGOHWKHVHLQFUHDVLQJO\GLYLGHGSRODULWLHVZKLFKLQWXUQ
heightens the risk of political instability, rupturing, failure and therefore increased anti-
political sentiment.  
 
This is a critical point. The traditional post-war bifurcation (Table 1, above) always 
GHPDQGHGWKDWWKHWZRPDLQSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVDGRSWHGDµELJWHQW¶µFDWFK-DOO¶µZLGH-QHW¶
± call it what you will - approach in order to have any chance of securing a 
SDUOLDPHQWDU\PDMRULW\7KLVZDVFDSWXUHGLQ$QWKRQ\'RZQV¶OHIW-right, bell-
curve and its emphasis on the centre or median voter. What the initial analysis of data 
from #GE2017 seems to be suggesting is that voter distribution may have shifted in a 
centrifugal manner. This shift towards µWZR(QJODQGV¶RUµWZRWULEHV¶LVFUXFLDOGXHWR
the manner in which it arguably makes offering the political bandwidth necessary to 
form a stable parliamentary government more difficult. It is also important due to the 
PDQQHU LQZKLFKD FULWLTXHRI µPDLQVWUHDP¶RU µHVWDEOLVKHG¶SROLWLFVKDVEHHQDNH\
element of this dynamic. This emphasis on bandwidth bring us to a fifth and final step 
WKDWIRFXVHVXSRQWKHFROODSVHRI8.,3DVWKHPDLQµRXWVLGHU¶Dnti-political party in the 
UK in the wake of the Brexit decision. 8.,3¶VQDUURZSROLF\IRFXV± immigration and 
membership of the European Union - couched within an aggressively anti-elite, anti-
establishment, anti-mainstream, anti-political posture allowed it to attract disaffected 
voters from both the left and the right of the political spectrum. But the Brexit vote 
undermined its basic raison d'être and surveys quickly revealed a hemorrhaging of 
support; and in the May 2017 local elections UKIP lost all of its 145 town and district 
councilors. 7KHSDUW\¶Vdismal performance in #GE2017 (securing just 1.8% of votes, 
a -10.8% fall from 2015) was therefore not entirely unexpected. But what was not 
expected was that the UKIP surge of 2015 would be replaced by a Labour surge in 
2017. The argument developed in the next section is that this occurred because Jeremy 
Corbyn adopted an explicitly anti-political µRXWVLGHU¶ platform that to some extent 
occupied the political space created by the demise of UKIP.  
 
 
2.  The Anti-Political Content of #GE2017  
 
 
The argument is not that Labour adopted a stance of raw or aggressive populism. But 
it is that Labour flirted with populist tendencies and inflamed anti-political sentiment 
E\H[SUHVVLQJRXWUDJHDJDLQVWWKHVWDWXVTXRDGRSWLQJDODQJXDJHRIµXV¶LH for the 
people¶ DV DJDLQVW µWKHP¶ LH for themselves¶ RIIHULQJ VLPSOLVWLF VROXWLRQV WR
complex problems and arguably over-LQIODWLQJWKHSXEOLF¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVDVWRZKDWDQ\
party could realistically deliver should it be elected. 8QGHU-HUHP\&RUE\QWKHµ1HZ
µ2OG¶/DERXU3DUW\¶RIIHUHGDPXWDQWRUK\EULGIRUPRIOHIW-wing populism and in order 
to explain this argument a five-part framework is developed that focuses upon: (1) the 
µ&RUE\QHIIHFW¶WKHµ0D\-ERWHIIHFW¶WKHµ8.,3HIIHFW¶WKHµ<RXWK-HIIHFW¶
and (5) WKHµGLYLGHGGHPRFUDF\¶ 
 
In many ways it is not just #GE2017 that was astonishing but that Jeremy Corbyn led 
the Labour Party into the election in the first place (see Goes, chapter 4, this volume). 
In the event, Corbyn was elected leader with a landslide of almost sixty 60% (with the 
VXSSRUWRIQHZµUHJLVWHUHGVXSSRUWHUV¶ZKRKDGEHHQDEOHWRSD\MXVWLQRUGHUWR
vote) playing a central role in his election. In many ways Corbyn was already adopting 
the role as a left-ZLQJµRXWVLGHU¶FDQGLGDWHRIIHULQJDGLVWLQFWLYHVKLIWWKDWUHFRJQL]HG
the impact of both the economic and cultural drivers of anti-political sentiment. The 
challenge, however, was for him to broaden his appeal within and beyond parliament 
and in the wake of his leadership victory this appeared a major challenge. In June 2016, 
Labour MPs passed a vote of no confidence in their leader by 172-DQGWKHSDUW\¶V
vote share then declined in each of the five by-elections held from October 2016 to Feb 
2017 (excluding Batley and Spen). 7KHUHVD 0D\¶V GHFLVLRQ WR FDOO D VQDS JHQHUDO
election was therefore widely expected to be calamitous for the Labour Party. 
 
$QG\HWLWZDVRQO\GXULQJWKHDFWXDOHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQWKDWWKHµ&RUE\QHIIHFW¶EHJDQ
to emerge and it did so on the basis of cultivating, attracting and channelling anti-
political sentiment. Although strangely counter-intuitive given his three decades as a 
full-time Westminster figure, Corbyn came across to large sections of the public as 
something of an anti-SROLWLFDOFXOWKHURµ&RUE\QPDQLD¶ZDVGULYHQE\WKHPDQQHULQ
which it exploited a rich vein of social feeling by offering a candidate that appeared 
principled, straight talking and ± quite frankly ± µdifferent¶ to the mainstream. The 
unkempt appearance, the scruffy beard, the cycle-clips, penchant to taking days off and 
sometimes shambolic interview appearances simply reinforced a view that Corbyn 
represented something very different to the smooth talking, media managed 
µSURIHVVLRQDO¶ SROLWLFLDQV WKDW KH H[SOLFLWO\ VHW KLPVHOI DJDLQVW 0RUH LPSRUWDQWO\
Corbyn understood the role of emotions and personal contact. Whereas Theresa May 
adopted something of a bunker mentality, Corbyn set about a quite remarkable number 
of speaking engagements across the UK, said to have been 122 within 33 days, which 
proved critical in terms of allowing him to cut through his generally negative portrayal 
in the media. Even his fiercest critics conceded that his rhetoric and fierce criticism of 
mainstream politics was injecting a new energy and dynamism into politics and the 
more he travelled the country µSUHVVLQJWKHIOHVK¶ the more the polls appeared to narrow. 
Indeed, political apathy amongst many social groups suddenly turned into political hope 
DQGH[FLWHPHQWDVWKHRQFHµQRKRSHU¶&RUE\QVXGGHQO\EHFDPHµDFURZGSXOOHU¶ 
 
Unvarnished he was and Obama-like he certainly was not but Corbyn clearly connected 
amongst some sections of British society in a manner that had been completely 
unexpected. The root of this success lay in the manner in which the Labour Party, in 
general, and Corbyn, in particular, had undertaken a populist makeover in order to 
capitalise on the anti-political mood that existed in the wake of Brexit. This strategy 
was first glimpsed in December 2016 when John Trickett, then the Labour elections co-
ordinator, VWDWHGWKDWµWe [the Labour Party] need to frame an argument about Britain, 
its past, present and future ± but we will be doing that in a carefully modulated way.¶
7KDWFDUHIXOO\µPRGXODWHGZD\¶WUDQVODWHGLQWRDVWUDWHJ\WKDWH[SORLWHGWKHH[LVWHQFH
of anti-establishment, anti-elitist, anti-political populist sentiments. To some extent this 
VWUDWHJ\VHHPHGWRµZRUN¶DQGZKDWZDVFOHDUZLWKWKHLVVXHRIHPRWLRQDOLQWHOOLJHQFH
DQGUHVRQDQFHLQPLQGGLVFXVVHGDERYHLVWKDW-HUHP\&RUE\QVHHPHGWRSDVVWKHµFXS
RIFRIIHHWHVW¶ZLWKPRUHSHople as the campaign progressed.2 Mrs May, however, did 
not pass this test, which brings the discussion to WKLVVHFWLRQ¶VVHFRQGWKHPHDQG the 
manner in which the Conservative Party did appear to connect with anti-political 
sentiment, but in a very negative manner. 
 
There are at least two ways in which the Conservative campaign managed to fuse with 
anti-political sentiment ± one political, one personal ± and, of course, the two are to 
some extent related. The first issue reintroduces the role of UKIP and the manner in 
which it exerted a blackmail effect on other parties. 7KHUHVD0D\¶VµKDUG¶%UH[LWVWDQFH
FRPELQHGZLWKKHUSURPLVHWREHDµEORRG\GLIILFXOWZRPHQ¶ in negotiations, and in her 
DWWDFNXSRQWKHµEXUHDXFUDWVRI%UXVVHOV¶ZHUHDOOLQWHQGHGWRreassure UKIP supporters 
that they could now enter the Tory fold. And yet, in making this shift to appease voters 
on the right, May arguably alienated an increasing number of more moderate 
supporters.  As the campaign moved on, the Tories¶ stance seemed to harden, to the 
H[WHQWWKDW0D\LQFUHDVLQJO\HPSKDVL]HGWKDWµQRGHDOZDVEHWWHUWKDQDEDGGHDO¶DQG
seemed to be threatening to simply walk away from the EU.  
 
Put slightly differently, the more the Conservative campaign progressed the more it 
almost seemed to prove and sustain a number of negative public beliefs about 
politiciansµ0D\-hem¶ZDVFUHDWHGE\QXPHURXV policy reversals - a µRemainer¶ who 
ZRXOGQRZOHDGWKH8.WR%UH[LWDQRSSRQHQWRIDQHDUO\HOHFWLRQZKRµUHOXFWDQWO\¶
decided to hold one, and ± critically ± the u-turn on a key element of the Conservative 
3DUW\¶VPDQLIHVWRLQUHODWLRQWRVRFLDOFDUHDQGWKHDOOHJHGµGHPHQWLDWD[¶The mantra 
RI µVWURQJ DQG VWDEOH¶, repeated robotically in every interview irrespective of the 
question, quickly emerged as an electoral liability that fuelled public concerns about 
machine politics and the µRQ-PHVVDJH¶SROLWLFLDQVZKRFRXOGQRWWKLQNIRUWKHPVHOYHV
Indeed, in a climate when politicians are widely perceived by the public to be detached 
and generally disinterested in the lives of ordinary people, 7KHUHVD0D\¶VDSSURDFKWR
the campaign seemed almost designed to fit with such beliefs. A preference for 
carefully scripted media engagements and an almost complete lack of spontaneous 
public interaction increasing made Theresa May look aloof, cold, distant and almost 
arrogant. Hubris rapidly descended into concerns about nemesis but by that point the 
SKUDVH µ0D\-bot¶ KDG HQWHUHG WKH SROLWLFDO OH[LFRQ DQG ZRXOG IRUHYHU EH OLQNHG WR
Theresa May. Even a carefully choreographed photo shoot that was designed to reveal 
a µVRIWHUVLGH¶to Mrs May backfired when the price of her designer leather trousers was 
revealed. Not only did this add fuel to the fire that she was out of touch but it also sent 
the wrong signals to a public that was struggling with the impact of austerity.  
 
To recap, the argument so far is double-edged. Jeremy Corbyn ran a good campaign 
because he cultivated his reputation as a radical anti-DXVWHULW\µRXWVLGHU¶FDQGLGDWHwho 
was vociferous in his attack on elites and mainstream politics. He SURPLVHGD µQHZ
SROLWLFV¶WKDWH[SOLFLWO\UHDFKHGRXWWRGLIIHUHQWFRPPXQLWLHVacross the emergent axis 
in British politic (Table 1, above). Theresa May, by contrast, ran a bad campaign due 
to the manner in which it appeared to confirm pre-existing prejudices about the political 
class and then to alienate large sections of her core voting constituencies with the 
publication of a misfiring manifesto. Rephrased, the political bandwidth of the Labour 
campaign wiGHQHGDVWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\¶VEDQGZLGWKVHHPHGWRQDUURZ and this 
was arguably evident from the moment their respective manifestos were published. 
/DERXU¶VZDVdistinctive in making a broad range of bold promises ± abolishing tuition 
fees, renationalising the railways, post office and utilities, free childcare, guaranteeing 
WKH µWULSOH ORFN¶RQSHQVLRQVPDLQWDLQLQJXQLYHUVDOEHQHILWV HWF ± which really did 
attempt to offer a wide bandwidth: it really was For the Many, Not the Few (the 
PDQLIHVWR¶VWLWle). The Conservative manifesto ± Forward Together - was unusual for 
the opposite reason, cRQWDLQLQJDOPRVWQR µUHWDLO¶SROLFLHV This focus on bandwidth 
leads into a discussion of µthe UKIP-effect¶ (our third issue). 
 
2IWHQ IUDPHG LQ WHUPV RI µD UHYROW RQ WKH ULJKW¶ WKH ULVH RI8.,3 KDG DOVREHHQ µD
SUREOHPIRUWKHOHIW¶GXHWRWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKthe party sought to attract large sections 
RIWKHSXEOLFZKRIHOWµOHIWEHKLQG¶,WWKHUHIRUHFXWLQWRWKH/DERXU3DUW\¶VWUaditional 
working class vote and this is reflected in the electoral geography of its strongest results 
(economically deprived, low income, low education, low skills and largely white parts 
of the country). In the wake of the Brexit referendum and their disastrous performance 
in the 2017 local elections the dominant assumption had been that most of the 3.9 
million people who had voted for UKIP in the 2015 General Election would now vote 
for the Tories, thereby helping to ensure the widely expected landslide. Research by 
Lord Ashcroft suggests that the situation was more complex and that around a fifth of 
2015-UKIP voters shifted their support to Labour in 2017 (Ashcroft 2017). The 
µRXWVLGHU¶VWDWXVRI-HUHP\&RUE\QZLWKKLVYRFLIHURXVFULWLFLVPRIPDLQVWUHDPpolitics 
and anti-austerity redistributive agenda proved attractive to many who had previously 
IHOWµOHIWEHKLQG¶ and this was particularly true for younger voters.  
 
A fourth feature of the (anti-)politics of #GE2017 was therefore the role and behaviour 
of the youth vote. Surveys, opinion data and election results have repeatedly revealed 
that: younger people tend to be more disillusioned, disengaged and frustrated with 
µPDLQVWUHDP¶SROLWLFVWKDQDQ\RWKHUGHPRJUDSKLFJURXSyounger people tend to be far 
more left-leaning and cosmopolitan in outlook; but they are also the cohort least likely 
to actually turn out to vote (Sloam, 2017). The challenge for the Labour Party was 
therefore how to energise the youth vote in order to translate anti-political sentiment 
into support for a µQHZSROLWLFV¶SODWIRUP$FFRUGLQJWRWKHDQDO\VLVRI,SVRV025,WKLV
is exactly what occurred as #GE2017 witnessed the highest youth turnout in a quarter 
of a century. It is estimated that 64% of registered voters in both the 18-24 and 25-34 
age ranges turned out to vote (from around 43% and 54% respectively in 2015) and this 
may explain a large amount of the unexpected Labour surge. Younger voters appear to 
have been HQHUJLVHGE\-HUHP\&RUE\Q¶Vcampaign DQGSXWRIIE\0D\¶VµKDUG¶ Brexit 
stance. More importantly what #GE2017 revealed was the existence of an increasingly 
divided democracy involving major inter-generational tensions. Younger people 
expressed themselves as µleft-of-FHQWUHFRVPRSROLWDQV¶, James Sloam (2017) argues, 
µreacting both to austerity politics and the cultural conservatism found in older 
generations and embodied by the Leave campaign in the EU referendum¶. 
 
The (anti-)politics of GE2017 therefore revolves around the funneling of frustrations 
within mainstream poOLWLFVLQWRDXQLTXHDOOLDQFHLQIDYRXURIDµQHZSROLWLFV¶,WZDV
WKHUHIRUH OHVV µDQWL-SROLWLFV¶ DQG PRUH µSUR-politics-but-a-different-way-of-doing-
SROLWLFV¶WKDWmanaged to offer a wide political bandwidth that could reach across the 
new bifurcation that increasingly exists between cosmopolitan and backwater areas. 
Coming to the same issue from a slightly different angle, the data suggests that Labour 
managed to win over a majority of 2016 Remain voters and about quarter of 2016 Leave 
voters which, in turn, raises the question of how it managed to straddle that divide. One 
response is that the party were able to channel anti-political sentiment through careful 
strategic framing, it also offered a very positive narrative of social change (i.e. pro-a-
different-politics) and ± critically ± the Labour Party focused on a far wider range of 
issues and policy areas other than Brexit. With reference to the final row of Table 1, 
Labour did succeed in terms of achieving strong support in cosmopolitan areas while 
also winning back a significant element of their traditional working class base in the 
µEDFNZDWHU¶DUHDVRI1RUWKHUQDQG(DVWHUQ(QJODQG7KH&RQVHUYDWLYHVE\FRQWUDVW
largely failed to reach beyond their core constituencies and this explains the unexpected 
narrowness of the result. But what it also reveals is the existence of an increasingly 
SRODUL]HGVRFLHW\RU µGLYLGHGGHPRFUDF\¶ LQ(QJODQGDQG WR VRPHH[WHQW WKHFULWLFDO
element of #GE2017 was the manner in which Jeremy Corbyn was able to build a broad 
alliance ± almost a social movement ± through the utilization of anti-political sentiment. 
And while widely interpreted as a dazzling success for the Labour Party, playing with 
populism in such an explicit manner could also be seen as an incredibly dangerous 
game to play, especially in the context of an increasingly polarized society. 
 
 
 
3.  The Perils of Playing with Populism  
 
This chapter has argued that the astonishing element of #GE2017 was the manner in 
which the Labour Party adopted an explicitly anti-political, anti-mainstream, µRXWVLGHU¶
status (almost to the extent that it existed outside and beyond its own parliamentary 
party). ,WZDVDVWUDWHJ\WKDWGHOLYHUHGµDJORULRXVGHIHDW¶DQGEHVWRZHGµDQLQJORULRXV
YLFWRU\¶ RQ 7KHUHVD 0D\¶V &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\ /DERXU succeeded in terms of 
cultivating and funnelling frustration with Corbyn acting as a lightning rod for anti-
austerity, anti-establishment and anti-mainstream politics. He also forged a particular 
connection with the young, ethnic minorities and significant sections of the white 
working class who had previously been seduced by the promises of UKIP. And yet the 
extent or nature of this (re)connection should not be misrepresented; nor the existence 
of a quite remarkable post-#GE2017 situation be over-looked. Put very simply - and in 
a manner that chimes with Tables 1 and 2 (above) -  the Labour Party gained the most 
ground in seats with the largest concentrations of middle class professionals and rich 
people, while the Tories made their biggest gains in some of the poorest seats in 
England and Wales. $QG \HW WR PDNH WKLV SRLQW WDNHV OLWWOH DZD\ IURP /DERXU¶V
achievement; what it really H[HPSOLILHVLVWKHEDQGZLGWKµVWUHWFK¶WKDWDQ\SDUW\PXVW
now somehow grapple with in order to secure office. Furthermore, the critical issue that 
this chapter seeks to bring to the fore is how Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party made 
such electoral strides and what it might have cost in terms of playing with populism. 
Put slightly differently, the dilemma for any politician or political party is that success 
demands a certain level of broad popularity but it also involves being able to resist the 
temptations of populism (i.e. to be popular but not populist). Highlighting this dilemma 
is valuable due to the manner in which it: (1) allows us to reflect upon where the 
boundary might lie between political popularity and political populism; (2) to explore 
why evidence of an increasing social bifurcation might create challenges that make the 
temptations of populism even more attractive to all parties; and (3) why this temptation 
must be avoided given evidence of democratic deconsolidation in many countries. 
 
The first question forces us to reflect upon whether it is fair to equate Corbynism with 
populism. Although some have rejected this interpretation, it is difficult not to see 
µ-H]]D¶V¶ VXFFHVV DV V\QRQ\PRXV with anything other than a distinctive brand of 
populism. There was an underlying and faintly sinister streak of intolerance towards 
anyone who criticised the Labour leadership. This led to accusations of bullying and 
harassment by numerous MPs who were unhappy with the direction of the party. The 
campaign utilised divisive rhetorical language based upon allusions to [corrupt] µWKHP¶
LHµSURIHVVLRQDO¶PDLQVWUHDPSROLWLFLDQVµWKHHOLWH¶µWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶) and idealised 
notions of  [pure] µXV¶LHWKHSXEOLFµWKHSHRSOH¶ RUµQRUPDO¶SHRSOHThe opening 
OLQHVRI&RUE\Q¶VILUVWVSHHFKRIWKHFDPSDLJQPDGHWKLVFOHDU 
 
7KH GLYLGLQJ OLQHV LQ WKLV HOHFWLRQ FRXOG QRW EH FOHDUHU IURP WKH RXWVHW« It is the 
establishment versus the people and it is our historic duty to make sure that the people 
SUHYDLO :H GRQ¶W ILW LQ WKHLU FRV\ FOXE :H¶re not obsessed with the tittle-tattle of 
:HVWPLQVWHURU%UXVVHOV:HGRQ¶WDFFHSWWKDWLWLVQDWXUDOIRU%ULWDLQWREHJRYHUQHGE\
a ruling elite, the City and the tax-GRGJHUVDQGZHGRQ¶WDFFHSWWKDWWKH%ULWLVKSHRSOH
MXVWKDYHWRWDNHZKDWWKH\¶UHJLYHQWKDWWKH\GRQ¶WGHVHUYHEHWWHU. 
 
It was a left-wing strain of populism that was as monist as it was moralist. It offered 
simple solutions to complex problems (usually a combination of nationalisation and 
increased public spending) and was particularly attuned to the plucking of popular 
emotions. It was populism aimed carefully at the middle-classes, working classes, the 
precariat and the unemployed; it was a patchwork quilt of promises designed to stretch 
over a broad bandwidth by allowing voters to focus on the part of the quilt that was 
specifically designed to appeal to them. .µOur job is to make Jeremy Corbyn the Left's 
'RQDOG7UXPS¶, whispered a political adviser at Labour's 2016 Christmas party µTrump 
shows if we take the anti-establishment message and run with it, anything is possible¶
(see Evans, 2017).  
 
And run with it they certainly did, nearly all the way to No.10. The problem, however, 
is that playing with populism is the political equivalent of playing with fire. I would 
therefore agree with Ben Chu that populism is a dangerous political virus but would 
also dare to suggest that, at times, Corbyn and the Labour Party strayed beyond that 
admittedly muddy boundary between courting popularity and invoking populism. This 
risk or danger with populism, however, is that it over-LQIODWHVWKHSXEOLF¶VH[SHFWDWLRQV
about what democratic politics can deliver and therefore makes failure to some extent 
inevitable. This takes us back to BeUQDUG&ULFN¶VFODVVLFIn Defence of Politics (1965) 
DQGKLVDUJXPHQWDERXWµWKHGLVLOOXVLRQPHQWRIXQUHDOLGHDOV¶WKDWPD\EHFUHDWHGE\
politicians who FODLPWREHDEOHWRPDNHµDOOVDGKHDUWVJODG¶7KLV LVQRWWRVXJJHVW
that, if elected, Labour could not have achieved a large amount, but it is to suggest that 
at times the social momentum that the anti-political rhetoric of Corbyn-ism managed to 
create might have overlooked both the innate, and inevitably dysfunctional, aspects of 
democracy while also almost denying the constrained capabilities of national 
politicians in the twenty-first century. Populist anti-political waves, like forest fires, can 
be easy to ignite if the right economic and cultural conditions exist in the sense of 
widespread frustration, fear and anxiety. But populist waves, again like forest fires, can 
be very hard to control or contain once a degree of momentum has been established; 
their destructive democratic power misunderstood until a dark and sometimes 
authoritarian situation has developed.  
 
Let me just underline and reiterate that I am not suggesting that if Jeremy Corbyn had 
been (or ever is) elected as Prime Minister that this would have inevitably led to a 
VLWXDWLRQ RI DXWKRULWDULDQ UXOH ,¶P VLPSO\ KLJKOLghting the manner in which his 
campaign arguably adopted a risky strategy by playing with populism and that there 
was something both distinctive and worrying about the ease with which this occurred 
and its potential implications. From a democratic perspective UKIP¶VULVHZDVarguably 
disconcerting but such concerns were to some extent allayed by the fact that it was so 
clearly a populist insurgency by an outsider party against the mainstream. A Corbyn-
fuelled Labour victory in #GE2017 might have given more cause for concern due to 
the manner in which populism would have infiltrated the mainstream. Anyone wanting 
to understand this argument in more detail would be well served by reading John 
Lukacs¶ Democracy and Populism (2005) as it underlines how populism is fuelled by 
the cultivation of fear and hatred that inevitably tends to eviscerate public confidence 
in democratic politics and is therefore ultimately destructive. $QG\HW WKLVFKDSWHU¶V
focus on British politics allows us to reflect upon and understand why the prevalence 
of populism appears to be increasing ± advanced liberal democracies are possibly 
becoming harder to govern. 
 
7KH FUXFLDO LVVXH KHUH UHODWHV WR WKLV FKDSWHU¶V UHSHDWHG IRFXV RQ WKH LVVXH RI SDUW\
SROLWLFDOµEDQGZLGWK¶7KHHVWDEOLVKHGSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVDUHODUJHO\FUHDWXUHVRIWKHODWH
nineteenth and twentieth centuries that solidified after the Second World War around 
relatively clear and stable electoral blocs ± the structures Martin Lipset and Stein 
Rokkan (1967) IDPRXVO\REVHUYHGZHUHµIUR]HQ¶WRDQXQSUHFHGHQWHGGHJUHH (Table 1, 
above). The evolution of society combined with technological developments and the 
LPSDFWRIJOREDOL]DWLRQKDVµPHOWHG¶WKRVHEORFVZKLFKLVFDSWXUHGDOEHLWLPSHUIHFWO\
LQ WKH FRQWUDVW EHWZHHQ WKH µFRVPRSROLWDQ¶ DQG µEDFNZDWHU¶ YRWHUV RU EHWZHHQ WKH
µVRPHZKHUHV¶ DQG WKH µDQ\ZKHUHV¶ 7DEOH  DERYH 7KH GHPRFUDWLF SDUDGR[ RU
challenge of governing is therefore made greater by the need to offer a coherent political 
µRIIHU¶WRDEURDGHUUDQJHRIVRFLDOJURXSLQJV7KHEDVLFSUREOHPEHLQJWKDWWKHPRUHD
party or candidate ties itself down to a specific policy position or decision the more 
likely it is to alienate a section of society whose support it needs to secure office. Put 
slightly differently, the challenge for democratic politics, especially in majoritarian 
polities, is therefore to build an electoral coalition that somehow straddles the divides 
created by the emergence of these new tribes while at the same time being honest about 
the limits of democratic politics.  
 
In this context populism represents an easy option due to the manner in which it offers 
JUHDWSROLWLFDOµEDQGZLGWK¶WKat can exacerbate socio-cultural or economic divisions in 
DPDQQHUWKDWXQLWHVWULEHVDJDLQVWµWKHP¶,Wcan be thrown like a net over the anxious 
or fearful, and it manipulates emotional triggers through the demonization of 
foreigners, bankers, immigrants, experts, elites, mainstream politicians, etc. Populism 
is not an ideology. It is a thin and dangerous political strategy to obtain and retain 
power. The paradox, however, is that in adopting explicitly negative, cynical and 
populist anti-political platforms in order to secure power politicians may themselves 
unwittingly serve to advance the deconsolidation of democracy (see, for example, Foa 
and Mounk, 2016, 2017; Jennings et al. 2017). The challenge for democratic politics is 
to resist the temptations of shallow populism and instead to take the more difficult path 
that seeks to redefine, reinvigorate and most of all reimagine the theory and practice of 
democratic politics in order to close the worrying gap that appears to be growing 
between the governors and the governed. This may be the core message arising from 
the (anti-)politics of #GE2017.  
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1
 Developed from the related arguments made by Ruth Davidson in 
http://unherd.com/2017/07/ctrl-alt-del-conservatives-must-reboot-capitalism/  
2
 7KH µFXSRIFRIIHH WHVW¶ VLPSO\ UHODWHV WRZKHWKHUDQ LQGLYLGXDO WKLQNV WKH\ZRXOG
enjoy sitting down and having a coffee or a beer with a candidate. It therefore 
HPSKDVLVHVVXEMHFWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIZKHWKHUDFDQGLGDWHLVDµJRRGJX\¶RUDµJRRG
ZRPDQ¶RYHUWKHLUSDUW\DIILOLDWLRQRUSROLF\SRUWIROLR 
                                                 
